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OPEN-MINDED IMITATION CAN ACHIEVE NEAR-OPTIMAL
VACCINATION COVERAGE
YING XIN§, DAVID GERBERRY†, WINFRIED JUST§,‡,*
Abstract. Studies of voluntary vaccination decisions by rational individuals predict that the
population will reach a Nash equilibrium with vaccination coverage below the societal optimum.
Human decision-making involves mechanisms in addition to rational calculations of self-interest,
such as imitation of successful others. Previous research had shown that imitation alone cannot
achieve better results. Under realistic choices of the parameters it may lead to equilibrium
vaccination coverage even below the Nash equilibrium. However, these findings rely on the
widely accepted use of Fermi functions for modeling the probabilities of switching to another
strategy. We consider here a more general functional form of the switching probabilities. It is
consistent with functions that give best fits for empirical data in a widely cited psychological
experiment and involves one additional parameter α. This parameter can be loosely interpreted
as a degree of open-mindedness. We found both by means of simulations and analytically that
sufficiently high values of α will drive the equilibrium vaccination coverage arbitrarily close to
the societal optimum.
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1. Introduction
While typically non-life-threatening for healthy individuals, seasonal influenza is responsible for
tens of thousands of deaths [48] and tens of billions of dollars of lost earnings [30] each year in the
United States alone. Given the capacity of universal vaccination to mitigate these consequences
and to protect especially vulnerable populations (i.e. children, pregnant women and the elderly),
the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommends that everyone 6
months of age or older get a flu vaccine every year [49]. Despite the CDC recommendation,
roughly half of the American population still does not get a flu shot each year [50].
The paper [20] reports that this empirically observed pattern is in accord with predictions of a
model that conceptualizes vaccination decisions as strategies in a multi-player game. In these
so-called vaccination games, rational individuals are assumed to reach a Nash equilibrium at
which each of them follows a strategy that minimizes each individual’s expected cost given
what the other individuals in the population do. At Nash equilibrium, the vaccination coverage
will not be sufficient for herd immunity, and the overall cost to the population will not be
minimized. This misalignment between what is optimal for a society (vaccination levels at the
herd immunity threshold) and what is optimal for individuals (freeloading on the rest of the
population’s vaccination) is often referred to as the vaccination dilemma [16]. The vaccination
dilemma was first described in [14], and then later independently in [21], albeit not phrased
in game-theoretic terminology. The first papers that cast this observation in terms of Nash
equilibria in vaccination games were [6] and [5]. Since these seminal papers appeared, the study
of vaccination games has mushroomed. A recent survey article [40] includes a total of 777
citations, including one book-length treatment [29].
While these general results on vaccination games explain how individual vaccination decisions
are likely to lead to lower vaccination coverages than the societally optimal herd immunity
threshold, they are based on several assumptions that will not be satisfied in a real population.
People may not have an accurate perception of the costs of vaccination (such as likelihood of side
effects) and infection, and they don’t always behave rationally. Moreover, disease transmission
in real populations is strongly dependent on the patterns by which people make contacts. On
the one hand, these factors can exacerbate the dilemma inherent in voluntary vaccination. On
the other hand, this creates opportunities for designing public policy that would eliminate or
alleviate the vaccination dilemma by offering appropriate incentives or effective dissemination
of useful information. Therefore most of the current research on vaccination games focuses on
understanding the processes by which people might arrive at their decisions to vaccinate or
remain unvaccinated, and how these processes will influence the resulting vaccination coverage.
In this paper we focus on the role of imitation. Imitation is prevalent in much of everyday
decision-making, in particular when the environment is complex or largely unknown. It can
be a very successful procedure for finding advantageous strategies in social games [33]. Social
scientists and psychologists have long recognized the importance of imitation, and it has recently
moved into the focus of economists [2]. An important concern in the study of imitation is that
inertia, resistance to change, may be present in nearly all decision-making processes [15].
The influential paper [16] presented a model that incorporates imitation into the decision-making
process for vaccinations against flu-like infections. In this model it is assumed that during a
vaccination campaign that precedes the actual outbreak of the disease, each focal individual i
independently makes a decision based on comparing his or her own costs C(i) in the preceding
season with the cost C(j) of one other randomly chosen individual j. Then i either follows the
same strategy as in the previous season, or switches to j’s strategy of the previous season. The
probability of switching is given by a so-called Fermi function
(1) pswitch(i→ j) = 1
1 + e−β(C(i)−C(j))
.
Thus the strategy of a much better performing player is readily adopted, whereas it is unlikely, but
not impossible, to adopt the strategies of worse performing players. The parameter β incorporates
the uncertainties in the strategy adoption, originating in either the variation of payoffs or in
mistakes in the decision making. In the limit β → 0+ player i is unable to retrieve any information
from player j and switches to the strategy of j by tossing a fair coin [22].
The first use of Fermi functions for determining the probabilities of switching to another strategy
is usually attributed in the literature to [7]. They are examples of “smoothed imitation” [35].
Other examples of smoothed imitation would be functions of the form
(2) pswitch(i→ j) = µ+ ν
α+ e−β(C(i)−C(j))+γ
for some suitable choice of parameters α, µ, and ν that gives probabilities.
There is evidence that switching probabilities as in (2) may be more realistic. In fact, [37]
reports the results of behavioral experiments on imitation in prisoner’s dilemma games. Analysis
of observed behaviors and curve fitting lead to probabilities of switching to the other strategy of
the form (2) with α = 1, ν = 1−µ and µ = 0.28± 0.07, β = 0.67± 0.28, γ = −0.11± 0.23 for the
switch from cooperation to defection. For the switch from defection to cooperation they found
µ = 0.25± 0.01, β = 0.99± 0.23, γ = 0.79± 0.14.
While in ODE-based models such as [3] the likelihood of imitation is often assumed to be pro-
portional to the difference in costs, Fermi functions are used in almost all published discrete-time
models of vaccination games with imitation. Sometimes the cost of the focal player is compared
with an average cost of several other players [18, 23, 25, 27], but the probability of switching still
follows the pattern of (1). In view of the results of [37] the question naturally arises whether
the particular form of smoothing functions given by (1) significantly influences the predictions
of models based on it; a question which has received surprisingly little attention in the literature
thus far. A notable exception is [47] where two distinct parameter settings in (2) that depend
on the current strategy of the focal player were assumed. For this type of setup, it is intuitively
clear that the equilibrium may shift towards the strategy with the more favorable parameters for
being imitated.
In this work, we will demonstrate that the choice of the form of the smoothing function itself
can significantly alter the model’s predictions even if the parameters in (2) do not depend on
the current strategy of the focal player. Most notably, we show that a suitable choice of the
smoothing function alone can drive the system to equilibrium vaccination coverages that are
arbitrarily close to the societal optimum of herd immunity.
There are four parameters in (2) in addition to the β of (1), but for mathematical convenience,
we will focus on models with switching probabilities of the form
(3) pswitch(i→ j) = 1
α+ e−β(C(i)−C(j))
that has only one additional parameter α ≥ 1. As will be shown in Subsection 3.2 below, this
modified switching probability models a situation where individuals only rarely compare their
costs with others, but are eager to switch when they do. Moreover, for every model that uses (2)
with γ < 0 there exists a corresponding model with switching probabilities of the form (3) that
for the same cost and disease transmission parameters predicts the same equilibria and intervals
where the vaccination coverage decreases or increases. The additional parameters of (2) may
influence the stability of the equilibria and how fast vaccination coverages approach them, but
they will not influence the positions of the equilibria.
We focus here on the case where the cost of vaccination is low relative to the cost of the disease
(see (4) below), which is the realistic one for flu vaccinations. We also assume uniform mixing of
the population to eliminate all aspects of the structure of contact networks that may confound the
effects of using the modified switching probability (3) in place of (1). Under these assumptions
it is reported in [16] that when α = 1, the equilibrium coverage is always even lower than
the Nash equilibrium, which is already lower than the societal optimum at herd immunity. In
stark contrast, we found that for all sufficiently large values of β, as long as we also choose α
large enough relative to β, the equilibrium vaccination coverage predicted by our model can be
arbitrarily close to the societally optimal value of herd immunity.
2. Our model
2.1. The basic structure of our model. Our model is a difference equation model that
predicts the time evolution of flu vaccination coverage from season to season very similarly to
the one of [16]. Each time step n represents a year or flu season, and Vn represents the proportion
of individuals in the population who decide to get vaccinated in season n. Decisions on whether
or not to get vaccinated may depend on individual experience in the previous flu season, the
current strategy of a host, and on imitation of one randomly chosen other host. These decisions
are assumed to be made by all hosts independently and simultaneously prior to any flu outbreak.
They collectively determine the vaccination coverage Vn in season number n. After individuals
make their vaccination decisions, the probability xn = x(Vn) of infection of any unvaccinated
individual in flu season number n is then calculated based on a standard SIR model. As in [16],
we assume here that the vaccine is 100% effective so that no vaccinated individual will experience
infection.
The model is initialized by randomly assigning strategies for the first season.
The above description is written in the language of an agent-based stochastic process, but we did
not actually implement and study the model for finite populations. Instead, our version assumes
a very large population and is a deterministic compartment-level model, based on expected
proportions.
2.2. Some parameters and implementation details. We let cv > 0 denote the cost of
vaccination, and ci > 0 denote the cost of infection. Costs are treated as fixed positive numbers
here that represent average costs. In our main result Theorem 3 we will assume
(4) ci − cv > cv > 0,
which corresponds in the terminology of [16] and its follow-up papers to an assumption that
the relative cost of vaccination c = cvci < 0.5. This seems realistic for infections like seasonal
influenza [17]. In our simulations we set cv = 1 and ci = 12, which gives a relative cost of c =
1
12 = 0.0833 that approximates the upper range of relative costs that were derived in [17] based
on data of [20] for influenza outbreaks in the U.S.
Before the next flu season n+ 1, each player i updates his or her strategy as follows:
• First player i picks a randomly chosen other player j.
• Then player i compares his or her own actual cost C(i) in the current season to the actual
cost C(j) of player j in the current season.
• Then player i switches to player j’s strategy with probability
(5) pswitch(i→ j) = 1
α+ e−β(C(i)−C(j))
and retains the current strategy with probability 1− pswitch(i→ j).
In the second stage of each season, after all individuals in the population have made their
vaccination decisions, there will be a flu outbreak. It is assumed to develop according to a
standard ODE-based SIR model with basic reproductive ratio R0 > 1 that is kept fixed over all
seasons. The limit s∞ of the fraction s of susceptible individuals as t→∞ will satisfy (see, for
example [11]):
(6) ln s∞ − ln s0 = R0 (s∞ − s0) .
In our model, s0 = 1− Vn, and xn(Vn) = s0−s∞s0 is then calculated from (6).
3. Preliminary observations
3.1. Costs, Nash equilibria, and the societal optimum. The expected costs cVn and cUn for
vaccinators and nonvaccinators in season n will be:
(7) cVn = cv and c
U
n = cixn.
Let
(8) Vhit = 1− 1
R0
denote the vaccination coverage at the herd immunity threshold. Then x is a strictly decreasing
function on the interval [0, Vhit] such that x(Vhit) = 0. At Nash equilibrium, we must have
cVn = c
U
n , and it follows that when cix(0) ≥ cv, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium with
vaccination coverage VNash ∈ [0, Vhit).
Now let us consider a societally optimal vaccination coverage Vopt. This is supposed to minimize
the following function that represents the average cost to the entire population:
(9) PC(V ) = cvV + ci(1− V )x,
where for V ∈ [0, Vhit] the function x = x(V ) is the unique solution in the interval (0, 1) of the
equation
1− x = e−Rx for R = R0(1− V ) so that
1− x = e−R0(1−V )x,
(10)
and for V ∈ (Vhit, 1] we have x(V ) = 0. This equation can be obtained from (6) by noting that
s0 = 1− V and s∞s0 = 1− x.
Theorem 1. Consider an SIR-model with vaccination and R0 > 1. Then
(a) If cv ≤ cix(0), then VNash < Vopt.
(b) When ci ≥ cv, then PC(V ) is strictly decreasing on the interval [0, Vhit]. In particular,
Vopt = Vhit.
(c) If cv > 2ci, then Vopt < Vhit.
(d) If ci < cv < 2ci, then there exists a critical value Vcrit ∈ [0, Vhit) such that the population
cost function PC(V ) is strictly decreasing on the interval [Vcrit, Vhit].
Parts (a) and (b) of Theorem 1 are well-known. Part (a) is precisely the vaccination dilemma that
motives interest in studying vaccination games. A proof of part (b) can be found, for example,
in [17]. Parts (c) and (d) are less well-known, if at all. To make this preprint reasonably self-
contained, we will include a complete proof of the entire Theorem 1 in the first part of the
Appendix 7.
Note that part (d) has a somewhat paradoxical consequence: Suppose ci < cv < 2ci and R0 is
large enough so that we still have cix(0) < cvVhit. Then Vopt < Vhit, as the expected societal cost
of not vaccinating anybody is lower than the cost of vaccinating a fraction Vhit of all individuals.
Assume, moreover, that some misguided mandatory vaccination policy is in place and has already
achieved a vaccination coverage that is close enough to Vhit. Then it becomes actually cost-
effective to throw good money after bad and increase vaccination efforts so as to achieve full
herd immunity.
3.2. Generalized Fermi functions. In Section 1 we mentioned three functional forms for the
probability of focal player i switching to the strategy of player j. Here we will discuss in more
detail the relationship between these forms and the roles of their parameters. For convenience,
let us repeat their formulas here. A fairly general form of smoothed imitation is given by
(11) qswitch(i→ j) = µ+ ν
α+ e−β(C(i)−C(j))+γ
,
where the parameters satisfy the inequalities α, ν > 0, µ, β ≥ 0.
In this paper we focus on the case µ = γ = 0 and ν = 1 with α ≥ 1, so that:
(12) pswitch(i→ j) = 1
α+ e−β(C(i)−C(j))
.
For α = 1 we recover the classical Fermi functions
(13) pswitch(i→ j) = 1
1 + e−β(C(i)−C(j))
.
Let us first observe that (11) and (12) are equivalent in the sense that they exhibit the same
directions of change and therefore produce the same equilibria with rescaled α and the same β.
Lemma 2. Consider two models with the same parameters β,R0 and with parameters α′ and
α, respectively, that satisfy α′ = eγα and α ≥ 1. Assume that in the first model the switching
probabilities qswitch(i → j) are given by (11) for α′, while in the second model the switching
probabilities pswitch(i→ j) are given by (12) for α. Then for any given vaccination coverage Vn,
the sign of Vn+1 − Vn in the second model will be the same as the sign of Vn+1 − Vn in the first
model.
Proof: Let Vn be the vaccination coverage for season n, and let ∆(n) denote the change of
vaccination coverage from season n to season n+ 1. Let us consider the second model first, as it
is the simpler one. In this model the switching probabilities are given by (12), so that
∆model2(n) = Vn+1 − Vn = (1− Vn)Vnsp, where
sp =
(1− xn)
α+ eβcv
+
xn
α+ e−β(ci−cv)
− (1− xn)
α+ e−βcv
− xn
α+ eβ(ci−cv)
.
On the other hand, in the first model where the switching probabilities are given by (11) with α
replaced by α′ = eγα,
∆model1(n) = Vn+1 − Vn = (1− Vn)Vnsq, where
sq = (1− xn)
(
µ+
ν
α′ + eβcv+γ
)
+ xn
(
µ+
ν
α′ + e−β(ci−cv)+γ
)
− (1− xn)
(
µ+
ν
α′ + e−βcv+γ
)
− xn
(
µ+
ν
α′ + eβ(ci−cv)+γ
)
= ((1− xn) + xn − (1− xn)− xn)µ+ ν
(
1
eγ
)
sp
= ν
(
1
eγ
)
sp.
Since ν > 0, the sign of Vn+1 − Vn in the two models is always the same. 
The parameter β plays similar roles in our generalized Fermi functions (12) as in the classical
version (13). As the left panel of Figure 1 shows, when β increases, the function pswitch(i → j)
becomes more like a binary switch that reacts to the sign of the payoff difference C(j)− C(i).
The parameter α has two effects. The first is that high values of α will make it less likely for the
focal player to switch to the other strategy. See the middle panel of Figure 1 for an illustration. In
particular, high values of α will have a stabilizing effect on the interior equilibrium of our model;
see Lemma 7 and Remark 1(a). Less frequent imitation could also be achieved by choosing low
values of ν, and in view of Lemma 2 we already know that the frequency of imitation alone
does not change the location of the interior equilibrium. The main result of this paper, that
imitation with our generalized Fermi functions (12) for sufficiently large α can give equilibria
that are arbitrarily close to Vhit, can be explained only by the second effect of α, which is a
more subtle one. To illustrate this second effect, let us think of a two-step process for making
the decision to imitate. In the first step, the focal player would make a decision on whether to
consider imitating another player (with probability pimitate = α−1) or simply do the same as in
the last season (with probability 1−α−1). In the first case, the focal player i would then compare
payoffs C(i) and C(j) for one randomly chosen player j and switch with conditional probability
(14) pswitch | imitate(i→ j) =
α
α+ e−β(C(i)−C(j))
.
This two-step-procedure is equivalent to the one-step decision given by (12). The right panel of
Figure 1 shows how the function given by (14) depends on α. We can see that for large α, the
focal player is very likely to switch to the other strategy once a decision to consider imitating
has been made, even if that other strategy might be slightly worse than the focal player’s current
strategy. For this reason we believe that high values of α can be thought of as representing
open-mindedness, understood as a willingness to experiment with new strategies unless there is
strong evidence that they are not working well.
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Figure 1. Dependence of the switching probabilities on the parameters and on
the cost difference. Left panel: pswitch for α = 1.2. Middle panel: pswitch for
β = 0.5. Right panel: pswitch | imitate for β = 0.5.
Let us also mention that the same effect of open-mindedness can be achieved by considering large
negative values for γ in (11). To see this, recall Lemma 2 and note that
qswitch(i→ j) = µ+ ν
α+ e−β(C(i)−C(j))+γ
= µ+
ν
α+ eγe−β(C(i)−C(j))
= µ+
νe−γ
αe−γ + e−β(C(i)−C(j))
.
In [47], functional forms for the switching probabilities as in (11) for µ = 0 and ν = α = 1
were considered. The authors suggested that positive values of γ represent inertia and negative
values of γ represent “eagerness to switch.” In the context of (11) the relation between γ and
inertia is not straightforward as low values of both µ and ν also give small overall switching
probabilities. However, the above calculations do show a direct correspondence between high
values of α and negative values of γ, with both of them having a plausible interpretation in
terms of open-mindedness.
4. Theoretical analysis of the model
4.1. Equilibria in our model. Let J : [0, 1] → [0, 1] denote the updating function that maps
Vn to Vn+1. This function J is continuous.
If Vn = 1, then all individuals vaccinate, and if Vn = 0, then nobody vaccinates. In either case,
no player can switch strategies, since there is nobody in the population to imitate who would
follow another strategy. So J(0) = 0, J(1) = 1, and V ∗∗ := 0, V ∗∗∗ := 1 are always equilibria.
However, we would be more interested in interior equilibria V ∗ ∈ (0, 1) for our model. Note that
in our conceptualization of imitation there is always a positive probability that a player will stick
with the current strategy rather than imitate another one, even if that other strategy gave a
vastly lower cost. Thus J(V ) = 0 only if V = 0 and J(V ) = 1 only if V = 1, which means that
the interior (0, 1) is invariant under J . If both V ∗∗ and V ∗∗∗ are repelling, then the updating
function J maps some interval [ε, 1− ε] into itself, and at least one such interior equilibrium V ∗
is guaranteed to exist by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.
The equilibrium V ∗∗∗ = 1 is always repelling. To see this, consider Vn ∈ [Vhit, 1). For very large
population sizes N , we will observe approximately Vn(1− Vn)N comparisons that may induce a
player to switch from vaccinating to not vaccinating, and the same number of comparisons that
may induce a player to switch from not vaccinating to vaccinating. In all these comparisons,
players who vaccinated will have born a positive cost, while players who did not vaccinate will
not have born any cost. Thus for any choice of the parameters α, β we will observe more switches
from vaccinating to not vaccinating than vice versa, and it follows that Vn+1 < Vn.
Thus if V ∗ exists, it must be in the interval (0, Vhit). Lemma 5 below shows that an interior
equilibrium exists in our model only if V ∗∗ = 0 is repelling and gives precise conditions on the
parameters for when this is the case. Lemma 4 below shows that if an interior equilibrium V ∗
exists, it must be unique.
The following theorem is the main result of this paper. It shows that for suitable choices of α
and β the interior equilibrium V ∗ will be arbitrarily close to the societal optimum Vhit.
Theorem 3. Fix any 0 ≤ V − < Vhit and assume the parameters α, β of our model satisfy the
inequalities
(15) 1− e−2β(ci−cv) − 2(1− x(V
−))
x(V −)
e−β(ci−2cv) > 0.
(16) α > max{1, eβ(ci−cv) + e−β(ci−cv) − 2eβcv − 2e−βcv}.
Then
(a) If 0 < Vn < V −, then Vn+1 > Vn.
(b) If an interior equilibrium V ∗ exists, then V ∗ ≥ V −.
Proof: Note that it suffices to prove part (a); part (b) is then an immediate consequence.
Let V −, α, β be as in the assumption, and let Vn < V −. We will show that the sign of ∆(n) :=
Vn+1 − Vn is positive. Let puswitch and pvswitch denote the conditional probabilities that a player
will switch strategies if that player did not vaccinate or did vaccinate in season n, respectively.
Then puswitch = Vnpswitch(u→ v) and pvswitch = (1− Vn)pswitch(v → u), so that
∆(n) = Vn+1 − Vn
= [1− Vn]puswitch − Vnpvswitch
=
[
(1− Vn)Vnxn 1
α+ e−β(ci−cv)
+ (1− Vn)Vn(1− xn) 1
α+ e−β(0−cv)
]
−
[
Vn(1− Vn)xn 1
α+ e−β(cv−ci)
+ Vn(1− Vn)(1− xn) 1
α+ e−β(cv−0)
]
= (1− Vn)Vn
[
xn
α+ e−β(ci−cv)
+
1− xn
α+ eβcv
− xn
α+ e−β(cv−ci)
− 1− xn
α+ e−βcv
]
= (1− Vn)Vn
[
xn(α+ e
−β(cv−ci))− xn(α+ e−β(ci−cv))
(α+ e−β(ci−cv))(α+ e−β(cv−ci))
]
+ (1− Vn)Vn
[
(1− xn)(α+ e−βcv)− (1− xn)(α+ eβcv)
(α+ eβcv)(α+ e−βcv)
]
= (1− Vn)Vn
[
xn(e
β(ci−cv) − e−β(ci−cv))
(α+ e−β(ci−cv))(α+ eβ(ci−cv))
+
(1− xn)(e−βcv − eβcv)
(α+ eβcv)(α+ e−βcv)
]
=
(1− Vn)Vn
(α+ eβcv)(α+ e−βcv)
[
quot(α, β)xn(e
β(ci−cv) − e−β(ci−cv)) + (1− xn)(e−βcv − eβcv)
]
,
where
quot(α, β) =
(α+ eβcv)(α+ e−βcv)
(α+ eβ(ci−cv))(α+ e−β(ci−cv))
.
Let
f(α, β) = quot(α, β)xn(e
β(ci−cv) − e−β(ci−cv)) + (1− xn)(e−βcv − eβcv).
Now to show that ∆(n) > 0, it suffices to show that f(α, β) > 0.
For β, Vn as in the assumptions we have xn > x(V −), and hence
1− e−2β(ci−cv) − 2(1− x(V
−))
x(V −)
e−β(ci−2cv) > 0,
1− e−2β(ci−cv) − 2(1− xn)
xn
e−β(ci−2cv) > 0,
1− e−2β(ci−cv) + 2(1− xn)
xn
e−βci − 2(1− xn)
xn
e−β(ci−2cv) > 0.
Then
1
2
xn(e
β(ci−cv) − e−β(ci−cv)) + (1− xn)(e−βcv − eβcv)
=
xn
2
eβ(ci−cv)
[
1− e−2β(ci−cv) + 2(1− xn)
xn
e−βci − 2(1− xn)
xn
e−β(ci−2cv)
]
> 0.
Moreover, the following inequalities are all equivalent:
quot(α, β) =
(α+ eβcv)(α+ e−βcv)
(α+ eβ(ci−cv))(α+ e−β(ci−cv))
>
1
2
2α2 + (2eβcv + 2e−βcv)α+ 2 > α2 + (eβ(ci−cv) + e−β(ci−cv))α+ 1
α2 + (2eβcv + 2e−βcv − eβ(ci−cv) − e−β(ci−cv))α+ 1 > 0
Thus for α > max{1, eβ(ci−cv) + e−β(ci−cv) − 2eβcv − 2e−βcv} we have
quot(α, β) >
1
2
.
Then
f(α, β) = quot(α, β)xn(e
β(ci−cv) − e−β(ci−cv)) + (1− xn)(e−βcv − eβcv)
>
1
2
xn(e
β(ci−cv) − e−β(ci−cv)) + (1− xn)(e−βcv − eβcv)
> 0.

Lemma 4. There can be at most one equilibrium V ∗ in the interval (0, 1).
Proof: In this argument we will treat x as a variable that is a function of V rather than of n.
Recall that this function is strictly decreasing, and hence invertible, on the interval [0, Vhit].
Consider the functions:
g(x) := quot(α, β)(eβ(ci−cv) − e−β(ci−cv))x+ (1− x)(e−βcv − eβcv),
G(V ) := quot(α, β)(eβ(ci−cv) − e−β(ci−cv))x(V ) + (1− x(V ))(e−βcv − eβcv),
(17)
where quot(α, β) is as in the proof of Theorem 3. It follows from our calculations of ∆(n) in that
proof that at an interior equilibrium V ∗ with x∗ := x(V ∗) we must have g(x∗) = G(V ∗) = 0.
Note that g(x) is a linear function with slope
(18) m = quot(α, β)(eβ(ci−cv) − e−β(ci−cv)) + eβcv − e−βcv > 0.
Thus the system can have at most one interior equilibrium. 
Lemma 5. The following conditions are equivalent:
(a) An interior equilibrium V ∗ ∈ (0, Vhit) exists.
(b) The equilibrium V ∗∗ = 0 is repelling.
(c) One of the following equivalent inequalities holds:
quot(α, β)x(0)(eβ(ci−cv) − e−β(ci−cv)) + (1− x(0))(e−βcv − eβcv) > 0,
x(0)
(
quot(α, β)
(
eβ(ci−cv) − e−β(ci−cv)
)
+ eβcv − e−βcv
)
> eβcv − e−βcv ,
x(0) >
1
quot(α, β)
(
eβ(ci−cv)−e−β(ci−cv)
eβcv−e−βcv
)
+ 1
.
(19)
Proof: Let g(x), G(V ) be defined as in (17). Then the conditions in part (c) are simply saying
that g(x(0)) = G(0) > 0.
Here x(0) = x(V ∗∗) is the predicted final size of an outbreak with no vaccination whatsoever.
Note that the function g(x) is linear in x and increasing by (18), while x(V ) is nonincreasing,
and strictly decreasing on [0, Vhit]. Thus G(V ) will be strictly decreasing on the interval [0, Vhit].
Since x(Vhit) = 0 and thus
G(Vhit) = e
−βcv − eβcv < 0,
it follows from the IVT that V ∗ exists if, and only if, G(0) > 0.
The updating in our model can be entirely understood in terms of the continuous function J such
that Vn+1 = J(Vn). Here and in the next subsection we will work with the following formula for
this function:
H(V ) :=
(1− V )V
(α+ eβcv)(α+ e−βcv)
,
J(V ) := V +H(V )G(V ).
(20)
Thus when G(0) > 0, then J(ε) > ε for sufficiently small ε > 0 and V ∗∗ = 0 will be repelling.
On the other hand, when G(0) ≤ 0, then we must have G(V ) < 0 for all V ∈ (0, 1], the
equilibrium V ∗∗ will be locally asymptotically stable and globally attracting on [0, 1), while V ∗
does not exist. 
Note that criterion (19) is different from the codition cv ≥ cix(0) that makes not vaccinating
the rational choice for all players. Similarly to Theorem 3, this implies that in our model we can
have an equilibrium vaccination coverage that exceeds the Nash equilibrium. For a numerical
example, see Subsubsection 5.1.1.
4.2. Stability of interior equilibria. Now let us assume that the interior equilibrium V ∗ exists
and let us investigate its stability, and also whether trajectories that start near enough V ∗ would
approach this equilibrium monotonically. We will work with the function J defined in (20).
A sufficient condition for stability of V ∗ is given by
(21) − 1 < dJ
dV
(V ∗) < 1.
Similarly, a sufficient condition for monotone approach to V ∗ is given by
(22) 0 <
dJ
dV
(V ∗) < 1.
By differentiating J with respect to V we find that:
dJ
dV
(V ∗) = 1 +
dH
dV
(V ∗)G(V ∗) +H(V ∗)
dG
dV
(V ∗)
= 1 +
dH
dV
(V ∗)(0) +H(V ∗)
dG
dV
(V ∗) = 1 +H(V ∗)
dG
dV
(V ∗),
= 1 +H(V ∗)m
dx
dV
(V ∗)
< 1.
(23)
Since H(V ∗) > 0 for V ∗ ∈ (0, 1), the last inequality in (23) follows from (18) and the fact that
x(V ) is a strictly decreasing function on [0, Vhit]; no special assumptions on α, β needed so far.
Now consider the term H(V ∗)m dxdV (V
∗) of the third line of (23). This term is always negative.
For local stability of V ∗ we need
(24) − 2 ≤ H(V ∗)m dx
dV
(V ∗),
and for monotone approach we need that
(25) − 1 ≤ H(V ∗)m dx
dV
(V ∗).
It remains to investigate bounds on dxdV (V ). We can argue here as follows: In the absence of
vaccination, x(R0) is a function of R0 that for R0 > 1 takes the value x that is the unique solution
of the first line of (10) in the interval (0, 1). (Here and in the remainder of this subsection we
use R to indicate a variable and R0 for the fixed parameter of our model.) When we administer
perfectly effective vaccine to a fraction V of the population, we decrease in effect the expected
number of secondary infections caused by an index case in the susceptible population by a factor
of 1− V , so that the dynamics boil down to an SIR-model with
(26) RV0 = R0(1− V ), or, equivalently,
R0
RV0
=
1
1− V .
Note that, in particular, by solving this equation for RVhit0 = 1, we obtain the herd immunity
threshold Vhit = 1− 1R0 . From the chain rule we get
(27)
dx
dV
(V ∗) =
dx
dR
(x(RV
∗
0 ))
dRV0
dV
(V ∗) = −R0 dx
dR
(x(RV
∗
0 )).
We will now use x as the variable for the final size of the outbreak in the SIR model with
parameter R = RV0 . By implicitly differentiating the function x(R) that is defined by the first
line of (10) we get
− dx
dR
= (−R0 dx
dR
− x)e−Rx =
(
−R dx
dR
− x
)
(1− x),
(R(1− x)− 1) dx
dR
= x2 − x,
dx
dR
=
x2 − x
R(1− x)− 1 =
x
1
1−x −R
.
(28)
We need to keep in mind that in (28) the variable x is a function of R. So our problem will
involve working with bounds for the expression
−R dx
dR
=
R(x− x2)
R(1− x)− 1 =
Rx(1− x)
R(1− x)− 1 =
x
1− 1R(1−x)
.(29)
that we get from combining (27) with (28).
Proposition 6. For all x ∈ (0, 1) the following inequalities hold:
−2 < x
1− 1R(1−x)
< 0
Proof: By the first line of (10), we have
R = − ln(1− x)
x
.
Then the inequalities we want to prove can be written as
−2 < x
1 + x(1−x) ln(1−x)
=
(x− x2) ln(1− x)
(1− x) ln(1− x) + x < 0,
and the result follows from Proposition 8 of the first part of the Appendix 7. 
This gives us estimates of (29), but what we really need are bounds on H(V ∗)m dxdV (V
∗). Let
S(α, β) :=
eβ(ci−cv) − e−β(ci−cv)
(α+ eβ(ci−cv))(α+ e−β(ci−cv))
+
eβcv − e−βcv
(α+ eβcv)(α+ e−βcv)
.
By the definition of quot(α, β) we get from (18) and (20) that
H(V ∗)m = (1− V ∗)V ∗
(
eβ(ci−cv) − e−β(ci−cv)
(α+ eβ(ci−cv))(α+ e−β(ci−cv))
+
eβcv − e−βcv
(α+ eβcv)(α+ e−βcv)
)
,
H(V ∗)m = (1− V ∗)V ∗S(α, β).
(30)
Note that the following inequalities always hold for 0 < V ∗ < 1:
(31) 0 < S(α, β) <
2
α
and 0 < H(V ∗)m <
2
α
(1− V ∗)V ∗.
Then
H(V ∗)m
dx
dV
(V ∗) = H(V ∗)m
(
−R0 dx
dR
(
x
(
RV
∗
0
)))
= H(V ∗)m
R0
RV
∗
0
(
−RV ∗0
dx
dR
(
x
(
RV
∗
0
)))
= (1− V ∗)V ∗S(α, β) R0
RV
∗
0
(
−RV ∗0
dx
dR
(
x
(
RV
∗
0
)))
= (1− V ∗)V ∗S(α, β) R0
RV
∗
0
x(RV
∗
0 )
1− 1
RV
∗
0 (1−x(RV
∗
0 ))
= V ∗S(α, β)
x(RV
∗
0 )
1− 1
RV
∗
0 (1−x(RV
∗
0 ))
,
(32)
where the last line follows from (26).
If V ∗ < S(α, β)−1 and 0 < x(RV ∗0 ) < 1, then by (32) and Proposition 6 we will have
H(V ∗)m
dx
dV
(V ∗) = V ∗S(α, β)
x(RV
∗
0 )
1− 1
RV
∗
0 (1−x(RV
∗
0 ))
> −2
Similarly, if V ∗ < 12S(α, β)
−1 and 0 < x(RV ∗0 ) < 1, we will have
H(V ∗)m
dx
dV
(V ∗) = V ∗S(α, β)
x(RV
∗
0 )
1− 1
RV
∗
0 (1−x(RV
∗
0 ))
> −1.
By (31) we have S(α, β) < 2α . Thus whenever α ≥ 2 we will have V ∗ < 1 < S(α, β)−1. Similarly,
as long as α ≥ 4, we have V ∗ < 1 < 0.5S(α, β)−1. This proves the following result:
Lemma 7. Consider the restricted model with imitations and parameters such that the interior
equilibrium V ∗ ∈ (0, 1) exists. Then
• α ≥ 2 is a sufficient condition for local stability of V ∗.
• α ≥ 4 is a sufficient condition for monotone approach to V ∗.
Remark 1. (a) The conditions in Lemma 7 are sufficient, but not necessary. However, as our
results reported in 5.1 show, some conditions on the parameters are needed even for stability.
Thus we will leave it as an open problem to find more precise conditions for local stability of V ∗
and monotone approach to this equilibrium.
(b) It is of interest to observe here that when we extend our model to allow for switching prob-
abilities of the form (2), then the expression for the updating function J changes. As long as
γ = 0 it will take the form
(33) J(V ) = V + νH(V )G(V ),
where the symbols H and G denote the same funtions as in (20). This follows from the proof
of Lemma 2. While the parameter ν will not affect existence and location of the interior equi-
librium V ∗, it will modify the calculation of the derivative of J so that in analogy to (23) we
obtain
(34)
dJ
dV
(V ∗) = 1 + νH(V ∗)m
dx
dV
(V ∗).
It follows that in versions of our model that allow larger values of ν, such as a version that would
use (14) instead of (3), we might see instability of V ∗ and sustained oscillations even when α is
large.
5. Numerical results
All numerical results included in this section were obtained by setting the cost parameters to
cv = 1 and ci = 12. Some details about the software that we used in these explorations can be
found in Appendix B 8.
5.1. Stability of equilibria.
5.1.1. Stability of V ∗∗ = 0. Lemma 5 predicts that a population that starts with V (0) ∈ (0, 1)
will evolve towards the equilibrium V ∗∗ = 0 where nobody vaccinates if, and only if
(35) x(0) ≤ 1
quot(α, β)
(
eβ(ci−cv)−e−β(ci−cv)
eβcv−e−βcv
)
+ 1
.
Interestingly enough, this condition is different from the inequality
(36) x(0) ≤ cv
ci
that gives the condition under which not vaccinating is the rational choice for the entire popu-
lation.
Suppose ci = 12 and cv = 1. Then (36) becomes
(37) x(0) ≤ 1
12
≈ 0.0833.
Figure 2 shows a heat map for the dependence of the right-hand side of (35) on α and β when
ci = 12 and cv = 1. When equality holds in (37) so that VNash = 0, then in the region below the
black curve the equilibrium V ∗∗ = 0 becomes repelling, with V ∗ ∈ (0, 1) predicted to exist.
Figure 2. Dependence of the right-hand side of (35) on α and β when ci = 12
and cv = 1. Created with script lowerbd.m.
5.1.2. Counterexamples to stability of V ∗. In order to identify regions of the parameter space
where V ∗ is locally asymptotically stable and where approach to this equilibrium will be mono-
tone, we numerically explored the value of
H(V ∗)m
dx
dV
(V ∗) = V ∗S(α, β)
x(RV
∗
0 )
1− 1
RV
∗
0 (1−x(RV
∗
0 ))
with our MatLab scripts critical_R0.m and stability_and_approach.m.
For a range of β values, we calculated the critical value of R0 at which H(V ∗)m dxdV (V
∗) = −1.
For α = 3, such R0 was not found for 1 ≤ β ≤ 50. Figures 3 and 4 display the results for α = 1
and α = 2.
Figure 3. Critical value of R0 at which H(V ∗)m dxdV (V
∗) = −1 for α = 1.
Figure 4. Critical value of R0 at which H(V ∗)m dxdV (V
∗) = −1 for α = 2.
In order to see how the seemingly strange inversion of shapes in Figures 3 and 4 occurs, let us
consider Figure 5 that shows what happens if we gradually increase α.
Figure 5. Critical value of R0 at which H(V ∗)m dxdV (V
∗) = −1 for
α = 1, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.55, 1.56, 1.565, 1.57, 1.575, 1.58, 1.59, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 2
Similarly, for α = 1 and for a range of β values, we calculated the critical value of R0 at which
H(V ∗)m dxdV (V
∗) = −2. Figure 6 displays the results:
Figure 6. Critical value of R0 at which H(V ∗)m dxdV (V
∗) = −2 for α = 1.
These results suggest regions of the parameter space where we would have interior equilibria V ∗
that are not approached monotonically and/or where V ∗ might be unstable. In order to better
visualize these regions, we color-coded them by distinguishing values in certain relevant intervals.
More specifically, we defined a function Int
(
H(V ∗)m dxdV (V
∗)
)
in the following way:
• Int (H(V ∗)m dxdV (V ∗)) = −4 if H(V ∗)m dxdV (V ∗) < −2,
• Int (H(V ∗)m dxdV (V ∗)) = −1.5 if −2 ≤ H(V ∗)m dxdV (V ∗) < −1.05,
• Int (H(V ∗)m dxdV (V ∗)) = −0.7 if −1.05 ≤ H(V ∗)m dxdV (V ∗) < −1,
• Int (H(V ∗)m dxdV (V ∗)) = −0.5 if −1 ≤ H(V ∗)m dxdV (V ∗) < 0,
• Int (H(V ∗)m dxdV (V ∗)) = 2 if MatLab cannot find V ∗ in [0, 1] for given α and β, or a
V ∗ in [0, 1] is found but the corresponding x(V ∗) is not in (0, 1),
In Figures 7–9, we plot the resulting color-coded partitions of the parameter space, together with
some sample trajectories of Vn in regions of interest that were calculated using our code FluVacc.
Figure 7. Color map of Int
(
H(V ∗)m dxdV (V
∗)
)
and sample trajectories for R0 = 2.43.
Figure 8. Color map of Int
(
H(V ∗)m dxdV (V
∗)
)
and sample trajectories for R0 = 12.
Figure 9. Color map of Int
(
H(V ∗)m dxdV (V
∗)
)
and sample trajectories for R0 = 13.
5.2. Predicted interior equilibria V ∗. The figures in this subsection show the interior equilib-
ria V ∗ ∈ (0, 1) of the vaccination coverage that we get as outputs of our script V_G0_2v_fsolve.m
that is briefly described in Subsection 8.2.2 of Appendix B. Figure 10 shows the dependence of
V ∗ on α and β in the form of heat maps for selected values of R0.
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(c) R0 = 5.0
Figure 10. Dependence of V ∗ on α and β via theoretical results described in
Section 8.2.2 for cv = 1 and ci = 12.
5.3. Simulation results. Figure 11 presents the results of direct simulation of our difference
equation model described in Section 2 using the script simulation_script.m that is briefly
described in Subsection 8.3.2 of Appendix B. For each combination of parameters α and β
the model is simulated to equilibrium (using a stopping criteria of |Vn+1 − Vn| < 10−5) with
the resulting vaccination coverage, V ∗, recorded. Even though this stopping criterion might
introduce some small errors, vaccination coverages from direct numerical simulation (Figure 11)
match those predicted by the theoretical analysis (Figure 10) remarkably closely. The contour
on each surface depicts where the model with imitation matches the vaccine coverage at the
Nash equilibrium, which is labeled on the contour. Therefore, we see that vaccination coverage
exceeds that of the Nash equilibrium for combinations of α and β that lie below and to the right
of this threshold.
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Figure 11. Dependence of V ∗ on α and β via numerical simulation of approach
to interior equilibrium. cv = 1, ci = 12, V0 = 0.5 and tol = 10−5.
6. Discussion
The problem of designing effective public policy for inducing people to vaccinate against vaccine-
preventable diseases is of great societal urgency [29]. To solve this problem, we need to understand
how people really make vaccination decisions and how certain factors that enter this process
influence the outcome.
The work presented here focuses on the role of imitation of successful others, which has been
well-documented to be an important component of human decision-making [2]. Our model builds
on the version of the model in [16] that assumed uniform mixing in the population. The only
difference is including an additional parameter α in the functional form for the probability of
switching to another strategy. This parameter can be loosely interpreted as a degree of open-
mindedness and has parallels in functional forms of these probabilities that were empirically
derived in [37].
Our results demonstrate that for sufficiently high values of α the predicted equilibrium coverage
will be arbitrarily close to the societally optimal value Vhit that gives herd immunity. They
were confirmed both analytically for large regions of the parameter space in Theorem 3 and by
numerical explorations of the equilibria predicted in the proof of this theorem (Subsection 5.2)
and the equilibria that are being approached in simulated evolution of the vaccination coverages
(Subsection 5.3). They stand in stark contrast to the results reported in [16] for the standard
Fermi functions, which under the uniform mixing assumption imitation leads to vaccination
coverage even below the Nash equilibrium when the cost of vaccination is small relative to the
cost of infection. As we deliberately kept our model as basic as possible and excluded all other
factors, such as community structure, incentives, or misperceptions, these radical differences in
the predictions can be due only to choosing a high value of α. We conclude that “open-minded
imitation,” based on switching probabilities of the form (3) with suitable choices of α, provides
a possible avenue for attenuating the vaccination dilemma.
The findings presented here open up a number of avenues for future research, in at least four
directions. The first would be to try tightening some of our theoretical results by proving
analogues under weaker assumptions. More specifically, conditions (15) and (16) of Theorem 3 are
sufficient, but not necessary, as our numerical explorations in Subsections 5.2 and 5.3 indicate that
the conclusion of the theorem remains valid under significantly weaker assumptions. Similarly,
Lemma 7 gives only sufficient conditions for stability of the interior equilibrium V ∗ and monotone
approach to it. Our numerical explorations in Subsection 5.1 indicate that these conditions
already give us a qualitatively accurate picture; it would be of some intrinsic mathematical
interest to find conditions that are simultaneously sufficient and necessary.
The second direction would be to examine the effect of the parameter α in extensions of our model
that incorporate a number of additional aspects of voluntary vaccination dynamics that have been
deliberately set aside here. We have already done some preliminary work on extending our model
to the case when the vaccine has an efficacy of less than 100% and found a similar pattern as the
one reported here in that equilibrium coverage can get arbitrarily close to the societal optimum.
However, the dependence of the optimal choice of α on β is more complicated than in Theorem 3
and still needs to be worked out in more detail. Other aspects that might be incorporated into
more detailed versions of our model are restrictions of disease transmission and/or imitation to
edges of contact networks, as has already been studied for the case of classical Fermi functions
in [16] and a number of related papers; see [39] for a review. Similarly, one can study the
effects of a mixture of rational decision-making and imitation [12, 31], incentives [27, 44, 45],
misperceptions of costs [4, 9, 10, 32, 38], altruism [34, 36, 46], peer pressure [23, 42], presence
of individuals who remain committed to vaccinating or not vaccinating without ever imitating
others [19, 28], the effects of other available control measures or treatment options [1, 8, 24,
26, 27, 41], or variability of R0 from season to season. One can also study the effects of our
parameter α when imitation is based on comparison with the average cost of a larger sample of
other individuals [18, 23, 25, 27], or when weighted averages of costs over a number of previous
seasons are being compared [43].
The third direction would be to study applications of our functional form (3) to domains other
than vaccination games. The paper [47] considers prisoner’s dilemma games in a finite population
with switching probabilities of the form 1
1+e−β(C(i)−C(j))−τs , where τs depends on the strategy of
the focal player. These can be considered rescaled versions of (3) (see the discussion at the end of
Subsection 3.2). The authors of [47] obtained a number of analytical results, but their focus is on
fixation probabilities, time to fixation, and stochastic stability of the equilibria, which is different
from ours. The literature on applications of evolutionary games with the structure of a prisoner’s
dilemma is vast, and vaccination games are only a small part of it. So it seems likely that our
version of (3) or its counterpart in [47] could find many applications outside of vaccination games.
Let us also remark that there may be some applications to evolutionary computation [13] as well.
In this field the balance between exploration and exploitation is of paramount importance, and
our interpretation of high α as open-mindedness bears some resemblance to shifting this balance
towards the former for high values of this parameter.
Finally, it would be important to get a better understanding of how our parameter α relates to
actual decision-making by real people and how public policy could enhance more “open-minded”
decision-making about vaccination in the sense captured by this parameter. This fourth direction
of suggested follow-up work would require a multidisciplinary effort that goes far beyond the
realm of mathematical modeling.
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7. Appendix A: Some technical results and proof of Theorem 1
7.1. Some technical results. Here we prove some elementary technical facts that are used in
several of our arguments.
Proposition 8. For all x ∈ (0, 1) the following inequalities hold:
(38) − 2 < (x− x
2) ln(1− x)
x+ (1− x) ln(1− x) < 0.
Proof: Let f(x) = (1 − x) ln(1 − x) + x be the denominator of the above fraction. Then on
(0, 1),
f ′(x) = − ln(1− x)− (1− x) 1
1− x + 1 = − ln(1− x) > 0,
f(x) > f(0) = 0,
(x− x2) ln(1− x) = x(1− x) ln(1− x) < 0.
Thus, we have proved the inequality on the right-hand side of (38).
For the inequality on the left-hand side of (38), for x ∈ (0, 1),
(x− x2) ln(1− x)
(1− x) ln(1− x) + x > −2
⇔ (x− x
2) ln(1− x) + (2− 2x) ln(1− x) + 2x
f(x)
> 0
⇔ (−x2 − x+ 2) ln(1− x) + 2x > 0
⇔ ln(1− x) > 2x
x2 + x− 2 .
Let h(x) = g1(x)− g2(x), where g1(x) = ln(1−x) and g2(x) = 2xx2+x−2 . Our goal is to show that
h(x) > 0 on (0, 1).
Note that g1(0) = g2(0) = h(0) = 0. On (0, 1),
g′1(x) =
1
x− 1 =
(x+ 2)(x2 + x− 2)
(x2 + x− 2)2 =
x3 + 3x2 − 4
(x2 + x− 2)2 ,
g′2(x) =
−2x2 − 4
(x2 + x− 2)2 ,
h′(x) = g′1(x)− g′2(x) =
x2(x+ 5)
(x2 + x− 2)2 > 0.
We conclude that the left hand side of (38) holds. 
Proposition 9. The function f(x) := x+ (x
2−x) ln(1−x)
x+(1−x) ln(1−x) is decreasing on (0, 1).
Proof: Notice that f can be rewritten as
f(x) = x+
(x2 − x) ln(1− x)
x+ (1− x) ln(1− x)
=
x2 − (x2 − x) ln(1− x) + (x2 − x) ln(1− x)
x− (x− 1) ln(1− x)
=
x2
x− (x− 1) ln(1− x) .
To show that f(x) is decreasing on (0, 1), we examine its derivative:
f ′(x) =
2x(x− (x− 1) ln(1− x))− x2(x− (x− 1) ln(1− x))′
(x− (x− 1) ln(1− x))2
=
2x2 − (2x2 − 2x) ln(1− x)− x2(1− 1− ln(1− x))
(x− (x− 1) ln(1− x))2
=
2x2 − (x2 − 2x) ln(1− x)
(x− (x− 1) ln(1− x))2 .
The denominator (x− (x− 1) ln(1− x))2 of f ′(x) is always positive on (0, 1). Thus it suffices to
show that the numerator
g(x) := 2x2 − (x2 − 2x) ln(1− x)
is negative on (0, 1). Observe that
g′(x) = 4x− x
2 − 2x
x− 1 − 2(x− 1) ln(1− x),
=
3x2 − 2x
x− 1 − 2(x− 1) ln(1− x),
g′′(x) =
(6x− 2)(x− 1)− 3x2 + 2x
(x− 1)2 − 2− 2 ln(1− x),
=
6x2 − 8x+ 2− 3x2 + 2x− 2x2 + 4x− 2
(x− 1)2 − 2 ln(1− x),
=
x2 − 2x
(x− 1)2 − 2 ln(1− x) = 1−
1
(x− 1)2 − 2 ln(1− x),
g′′′(x) =
2
(x− 1)3 −
2
x− 1 =
2− 2x2 + 4x− 2
(x− 1)3
=
2x(2− x)
(x− 1)3 < 0 on (0, 1).
Since g(0) = g′(0) = g′′(0) = 0, we conclude that g is concave down with g′(x) < 0 and g(x) < 0
on (0, 1). 
7.2. Proof of Theorem 1. We will consider the sign of the derivative
(39)
dPC
dV
= cv − cix+ d x
dV
ci(1− V ).
We already know that under the assumptions of the theorem we must have VNash ∈ (0, Vhit).
Then cv−cix = cv−cix(VNash) = 0 by the definition of a Nash equilibrium, and d xd V (VNash) < 0.
Thus dPCdV (VNash) < 0, which means that the societal cost can be decreased by increasing the
vaccination coverage above Nash equilibrium.
For V ∈ (0, VNash),
dPC
dV
= cv − cix(V ) + dx
dV
ci(1− V )
≤ cv − cix(VNash) + dx
dV
ci(1− V ) = dx
dV
ci(1− V ) < 0.
This proves part (a).
For the proof of parts (c) and (d), recall that we already know that Vopt ∈ [0, Vhit]. We only need
to exclude the possibility that Vopt = Vhit. It is not immediately clear though whether d xd V (Vhit)
exists. Thus we want to investigate
(40) lim
V→V −hit
dPC
dV
(V ) = cv + ci(1− V ) lim
V→V −hit
d x
dV
(V ).
By implicitly differentiating the second line of (10) we obtain:
d (1− x)
d V
=
d
d V
e−R0(1−V )x
− d x
dV
= e−R0(1−V )x
d
d V
(−R0(1− V )x)
d x
dV
= R0(1− x) d
d V
(x(1− V ))
d x
dV
= R0(1− x)
(
(1− V ) d x
dV
− x
)
d x
dV
(1−R0(1− x)(1− V )) = −R0(1− x)x
dx
dV
=
−R0(1− x)x
(1−R0(1− x)(1− V ))
d x
dV
=
−R0(1− x)x(
1 + (1−x) ln(1−x)x
)
d x
dV
=
−R0(x2 − x3)
x+ (1− x) ln(1− x))
lim
V→V −hit
d x
dV
= lim
x→0+
d x
dV
= lim
x→0+
R0(x3 − x2)
x+ (1− x) ln(1− x)
(H)
= lim
x→0+
R0(3x2 − 2x)
1− ln(1− x)− 1−x1−x
= lim
x→0+
R0(3x− 2)x
− ln(1− x) = −2R0.
(41)
Now parts (c) and (d) follow from substituting −2R0 for limV→V −hit
d x
d V and 1−V = 1−Vhit = 1R0
in (40).
For the proof of part (b), notice that in view of the above calculations and of the second line
of (10):
dPC
dV
= cv − ci
(
x− (1− V ) d x
dV
)
= cv − ci
(
x− (1− V ) R0(x
3 − x2)
x+ (1− x) ln(1− x)
)
= cv − ci
(
x+
(x2 − x) ln(1− x)
x+ (1− x) ln(1− x)
)
.
(42)
By Proposition 9, the function f(x) := x + (x
2−x) ln(1−x)
x+(1−x) ln(1−x) is decreasing on (0, 1). Moreover, by
Proposition 8,
0 <
(x2 − x) ln(1− x)
x+ (1− x) ln(1− x)
on (0, 1). Thus
1 < x+
(x2 − x) ln(1− x)
x+ (1− x) ln(1− x) ,
and it follows that
dPC
dV
= cv − ci
(
x+
(x2 − x) ln(1− x)
x+ (1− x) ln(1− x)
)
< cv − ci ≤ 0
for 0 ≤ V < Vhit when ci ≥ cv. 
8. Appendix B: Description of our software
We coded several programs that allowed us to numerically explore various aspects of some of our
models. Here we give brief descriptions of how they work. The codes themselves and complete
documentations are available from the authors upon request.
8.1. Code for predicting stability of interior equilibria. Here we have two scripts.
Our codes for predicting stability of V ∗ is based on estimating the derivative d J(V )d V as caclculated
in (20) and observing that for local stability of V ∗ we need
(43) − 2 ≤ H(V ∗)m dx
dV
(V ∗),
while for monotone approach to V ∗ we need
(44) − 1 ≤ H(V ∗)m dx
dV
(V ∗).
8.1.1. critical_R0.m. For given α and a range of β values, this script calculates the critical
value of R0 at which
H(V ∗)m
dx
dV
(V ∗) = −1 or − 2
so that damped oscillations near the interior equilibrium V ∗ are predicted to appear/disappear
or the local stability of V ∗ is predicted to change. The code plots a graph of the dependence of
these critical values on β. .
8.1.2. stability_and_approach.m. This script explores stability of equilibria for a user-defined
range of parameter values (α, β) when the other parameters are kept fixed.
For given parameters, the script computes the values of H(V ∗)m dxdV (V
∗) and compares them
with −1 to check for predicted oscillations near V ∗ (see (44)) and with −2 to check for local
asymptotic stability of V ∗ (see (43)).
It outputs a color map of H(V ∗)m dxdV (V
∗) by distinguishing values in certain relevant intervals.
More specifically, it displays colors for the function Int
(
H(V ∗)m dxdV (V
∗)
)
that we defined in the
following way:
• Int (H(V ∗)m dxdV (V ∗)) = −4 if H(V ∗)m dxdV (V ∗) < −2,
• Int (H(V ∗)m dxdV (V ∗)) = −1.5 if −2 ≤ H(V ∗)m dxdV (V ∗) < −1.05,
• Int (H(V ∗)m dxdV (V ∗)) = −0.7 if −1.05 ≤ H(V ∗)m dxdV (V ∗) < −1,
• Int (H(V ∗)m dxdV (V ∗)) = −0.5 if −1 ≤ H(V ∗)m dxdV (V ∗) < 0,
• Int (H(V ∗)m dxdV (V ∗)) = 2 if MatLab cannot find V ∗ in [0, 1] for given α and β, or a
V ∗ in [0, 1] is found but the corresponding x(V ∗) is not in (0, 1),
8.2. Code for numerically predicting equilibria. Here we have two scripts.
8.2.1. lowerbd.m. This script calculates the right-hand side of the last line of (19) for a user-
specified range of values of the parameters α and β and graphically displays these values as a
heat map. A black curve in the heat map gives the comparison with cvci ≈ 0.0833.
8.2.2. V_G0_2v_fsolve.m. Computes the vaccination coverage equilibrium 0 < V ∗ < 1 that
makes G(V ∗) = 0 if such V ∗ exists based on the formula for ∆(n) = Vn+1− Vn that was used in
the proof of Theorem 3. It performs these calculations for a user-specified range of values for α
and β while the other model parameters are kept fixed.
The script outputs a matrix that contains the predicted values of the interior equilibria V ∗ for
all pairs (α, β) of parameters explored and a heatmap that graphically displays these values.
For each pair of α and β the code uses fsolve to numerically find V ∗ ∈ (0, 1) so that ∆(n) =
Vn+1 − Vn = 0 when Vn = V ∗.
8.3. Code for simulating evolution of vaccination coverage.
8.3.1. FluVacc. The package FluVacc of MatLab codes allows the user to simulate the dynamics
of our model, as well as in several modifications of it that are not yet covered by this preprint.
In particular, it allows to monitor time evolution of vaccination coverages and numerically find
Nash equilibria.
Input parameters can be specified by means of a GUI. The simulation results reported in this
preprint are based on running a modified version FluVacc_Batch05.m of the code that allows for
batch processing and uses Model option iBf. Reported Nash equilibria were found using Model
option DBf.
8.3.2. Batch Simulation. The software package Batch Simulation is primarily made up of
scripts from FluVacc modified to allow for batch simulations over ranges of parameters rather
than requiring prompted user inputs. In addition to modified scripts from FluVacc to run the
simulations, the package includes a MatLab script simulation_script.m to set up the batch
of simulations and the R script surfaces.R that reads in output data of the batch simulations
and creates graphics of the results.
• simulation_script.m This is the main file for setting up and running the batch simu-
lations.
• FluVacc_Batch05.m Modified form of FluVacc.m. Modification include:
– removed GUIs and restricted Model to option iBf and OutForm to option Vc
– runs simulation until equilibrium which is defined by vaccination coverage changes
by < tol (rather than for a fixed number of seasons) or a maximum number of
seasons is reached
– has loops to run simulations for ranges of α and β
– saves relevant data to matrix to sensitivity_output
• Surfaces.R
R-script for reading in sensitivity_output matrix, parsing it into relevant simulation
studies and creating graphics of the results.
Takes as input a folder name, reads in simulation result matrix, and make surface
plots of relevant simulations in an output folder. For each combination of certain input
parameters, the scripts creates surface plots in the α–β plane of
– V: the Vaccination level of the population at fixed point
– C: the overall average Cost to the population at fixed point
– SEA: the number of SEAsons that each simulation took to reach fixed point
